HORSE RACING

Oklahoma Supreme Court (2008)  Board of Stewards order ineffective for lack of timely notice.

Ashikian v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission

Board of Stewards order ineffective for lack of timely notice.  ADDED XXXXX 2008

ASHIKIAN v. STATE  ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMMISSION

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

2008 WL 2600979

July 1, 2008

Summary of Opinion

Plaintiff, Ashikian, a race horse trainer, was issued a license by the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (OHRC) in 2000.  She raced her horses at Blue Ribbon Downs.  Her license expired on December 31 and she returned to Houston.  There were outstanding bills at the Oklahoma track and Plaintiff was notified of the bills and the subsequent action taken by the OHRC but the notice was not forwarded.  Plaintiff raced her horses in Iowa winning several purses.  She learned of the problem in Oklahoma and paid the outstanding obligation.  The Iowa racing commission learned about the problem in Oklahoma and ordered Plaintiff to return all monies won in Iowa.  Plaintiff seeks relief based on her lack of notice and that the Stewards’ power over her had expired and they lacked the authority to declare her suspended or ineligible.  This court held that the OHRC failed to extend the Board of Stewards’ authority to deal with unresolved race-meet matters in a timely manner hence the Board’s order is ineffective for want of power.

Text of opinion

The issue presented on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) erred in affirming a trial judge's summary judgment for plaintiff/appellee, whose terms declare an order of the Blue Ribbon Downs Board of Stewards to be void for want of jurisdiction. We answer in the negative.

I.

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

Cynthia Ashikian (Ashikian or trainer) trains and races horses for a living throughout the United States and Canada. In October, 2000 she was issued a license by the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (OHRC or Commission) and raced her horses at the Blue Ribbon Downs Race Track from 25 November through 10 December 2000. Her license expired by its own terms on 31 December of that year.

At the end of the season the race track claimed Ashikian owed $462.00 for stall rental. On 5 January 2001 the Board of Stewards (Stewards) for Blue Ribbon Downs sent her a letter apprising her of this unpaid liability.

The contents of this letter informed Ashikian that (1) a financial complaint had been filed against her (2) if it was not satisfied within 15 days a hearing may be scheduled before the Board of Stewards and (3) she may be subject to a fine or suspension. This letter indicated a copy of the complaint was enclosed. (state's exhibits in support of its motion to dismiss)

The debt was not paid, and on 18 March the Stewards sent Ashikian notice to appear at a hearing to determine if she was in violation of the track's financial responsibility rules. The notice was sent by certified mail to the Houston, Texas address she provided the OHRC in her license application. It was not forwarded to her.

Ashikian does not explicitly claim that this notice was not forwarded to her. A copy of the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals decision submitted with trainer's petition reveals that the certified return receipt was signed by someone at the address Ashikian provided to the OHRC, but the letter was not forwarded to her. (trainer's exhibit “E”) The state provides a copy of a signed postal receipt dated 21 March 2001sent to the address provided by trainer. (state's exhibits in support of its motion to dismiss, exhibit D)

The terms of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-13 provide:

“Whenever notice is required to be given by the Commission or the Stewards, such notice shall be given in writing by personal delivery to the person to be notified; or by mailing, certified mail, return receipt requested, such notice to the last known address furnished to the Commission; or may be given as is provided for service of process in a civil proceeding in the State of Oklahoma and pursuant to the provision of the Administrative Procedures Act, 75 O.S. § 309.”

Ashikian's petition did not urge lack of notice with any specificity. Her reference to the issue of notice is stated in paragraph 5 which provides:

“However, without Plaintiff's knowledge and without Plaintiff having received any Notice thereof, the Board of Stewards of BRDRT, acting under and pursuant to the authority of OHRC, purported to conduct a Hearing for violation of Rule 325:35-1-10, Financial Responsibility, based on Plaintiff's failure to pay BRDRT $462.00 for stall rental. Because Plaintiff did not appear at the appointed time the Board of Stewards found Plaintiff in violation of Rule 325:35-1-10 and ordered plaintiff ‘suspended/ineligible for licensing’ in Oklahoma.”

In her supplemental brief before this court, trainer urged with specificity the issue of inadequate notice. We do not address this issue as it was untimely brought.

She failed to appear at the 18 April 2001 hearing. The Stewards' order, issued on her default, provides that she was “suspended/ineligible for licensing pending settlement of her financial obligation.”

In April, 2001 Ashikian was granted a racing license by the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission (IRGC). She raced her horses there from April through June that year. Several of her horses earned prize money. In early July she learned of the action taken against her in Oklahoma. She tendered the amount due and was restored to good standing with the OHRC. Pending settlement of this obligation, the Iowa Board of Stewards learned of the action taken against her in Oklahoma and ordered her to disgorge all monies won by her horses in Iowa.  The Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals affirmed this order.

In May, 2002 Ashikian sought an order from the District Court, Sequoyah County, declaring the Stewards' order to be void and awarding her an attorney's fee and costs. She urged (1) she did not receive notice of the hearing and (2) the Stewards' order was void for want of jurisdiction because (a) their jurisdiction over her matter had terminated and had not been timely extended and (b) they lacked authority to declare her to be “suspended/ineligible.” The appellants (OHRC and the Stewards, represented by the Attorney General will be collectively referred to as appellants or state) responded by a motion to dismiss, urging Ashikian's claim was an impermissible collateral attack on an unappealed final order.  The trial court denied this motion, and its ruling is not tendered for our review. Ashikian then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the Stewards' order is void for want of jurisdiction. The trial judge granted trainer's motion and awarded her costs and an attorney's fee.  COCA affirmed the decision.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary process is a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes.  It is a search for undisputed material facts which, sans forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.  Summary relief is permissible where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense.  Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or defense may afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary process for a claim's total or partial adjudication.

Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo review.  All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.  Just as nisi prius courts are called upon to do in deciding whether summary relief is warranted in the first instance, so also do appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test for its legal sufficiency all evidentiary material received in summary process as support for the relief to be granted.  Only if the court should conclude there is no material fact (or inference) in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to the summary relief that is sought.

III.

COCA'S RULING AND THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED ON CERTIORARI

COCA affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for Ashikian and ruled the Stewards' order was void for want of jurisdiction. This was so because although the Stewards had the authority to prohibit the trainer from obtaining a new license, its jurisdiction had expired for want of a timely extension by the Commission. COCA's decision was bottomed on the provisions of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7  whose terms deal with the Stewards' jurisdiction to suspend or fine. The pertinent terms of the rule provide “[i]n the event a dispute or controversy arises during a race meeting which is not settled within the Stewards' thirty-day jurisdiction, then the authority of the Stewards may be extended by authority of the Commission for the period necessary to resolve the matter, ...” [emphasis ours] COCA agreed with the trial judge that the OHRC executive director's letter of 15 February 2001 that is relied upon as having extended the Stewards' jurisdiction was ineffective. The Stewards' jurisdiction to deal with the matter before them ceased on 9 January 2001 (30 days after the race meeting) and could not be “revived” in accordance with the provision's terms.  The order hence was devoid of legal effect.

¶ 9 The state disagrees with this interpretation of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7. It also continues to urge that Ashikian's district-court challenge is an impermissible collateral attack on the Stewards' order. This is so because (1) she lodged neither a timely appeal nor a review proceeding for relief from the order  and (2) the order is not tainted by facial invalidity.

IV.

A.

THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE FOR OUR REVIEW UPON A CHALLENGE TO THE AGENCY'S JURISDICTION

Absent a timely judicial review in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Procedures Act, 75 O.S.2001 § 318,  an OHRC final order is impervious to attack. This finality bar presupposes the existence of a prior decision that is facially valid. It is not applicable to an order that is facially void for want of jurisdiction.  Deemed void is only that decision which on the face of the record reveals that at least one of the three requisite elements of jurisdiction was absent, i.e., the trial tribunal's power (a) over the parties, (b) over the subject matter or (c) to pronounce the contested decision that was rendered.  When a jurisdictional infirmity is apparent from a facial inspection of the trial tribunal's proceedings,  its decision may be collaterally attacked and set aside upon request of either party at any time.  The district court's inquiry into the validity of an administrative agency's order (that escaped review on direct appeal) stands confined to determining, from an inspection of the face of that agency's proceedings (i.e., the application, the process by which the parties were notified, and the agency's order) if the agency met the jurisdictional prerequisites.^FN24Where extrinsic evidence is needed to show the jurisdiction's absence, the decision is not facially invalid although it may be declared voidable.

According to the state, nothing in the administrative record (the administrative equivalent of a district court's judgment roll) reveals a want of subject-matter jurisdiction by the Stewards.  For a showing that an administrative order lacks facial validity, the entire agency judgment roll must be included in the materials presented for review. The burden is cast on the party challenging the validity of a judgment or administrative order to provide the record revealing a total absence of at least one of the three jurisdictional components.  A reviewing court may take notice only of that record which stands before it.

Ashikian's petition before the district court asserts the Stewards' jurisdiction had not been extended prior to 10 January 2001. The exhibits submitted with her petition reveal that the race meeting ended on 10 December 2000 and the Stewards' order was issued on 18 April 2001.  This information alone is not proof that Stewards' lacked jurisdiction over the matter. According to the state, the alleged defect that is critical for a challenge to the Stewards' subject-matter jurisdiction-the dates of the race meeting and when OHRC acted to extend the Stewards' jurisdiction-forms no part of the administrative record.  The state contends that one must look outside the four corners of the record to obtain this information. Although the materials provided by Ashikian do not affirmatively show the Stewards' lack of subject-matter jurisdiction here, the state supplied this missing critical information by the inclusion of its (1) brief in support of its motion to dismiss (2) answer to trainer's petition and (3) response to Ashikian's summary judgment motion and its cross-motion for the same . It is the state's provision of this information for the trainer's challenge proceedings before the district court that supplies the missing links for the latter's cognizance as part of the agency's judgment roll in this cause.

B.

THE BOARD OF STEWARDS' AUTHORITY WAS NOT TIMELY EXTENDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF OHRC RULE 325:1-1-7, AND ITS ORDER WAS HENCE VOID FOR WANT OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

Having settled those materials which are properly available for a reviewing court's cognizance when a jurisdictional challenge is brought, we turn next to COCA's ruling that the Stewards did not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over today's cause in accordance with the terms of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7. We repeat that the sentence in controversy provides, “[i]n the event a dispute or controversy arises during a race meeting which is not settled within the Stewards' thirty-day jurisdiction, then the authority of the Stewards may be extended by authority of the Commission for the period necessary to resolve the matter, ...” [emphasis ours]

apply with equal force to administrative rules.^FN35 In absence of a contrary definition, words are to have the same meaning as that attributed to them in ordinary and usual parlance.^FN36According to the state, COCA and the trial judge misinterpreted the critical sentence to mean the Stewards' authority must be extended before the end of the thirty-day period .This, according to the state, is incorrect because (1) of the common meaning of the word “then”  ^FN37 (2) the need to extend the Stewards' jurisdiction cannot be fully ascertained until the entire thirty-day period has lapsed and (3) the rule does not require an extension of jurisdiction to take place before the passage of the thirty-day period. Further, COCA and the trial judge failed to give deference to the Commission's interpretation of its rule when the latter exercised its power to extend the Stewards' jurisdiction after the thirty-day period had closed.^FN38