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U.S. Court of Appeals (2009)  Automatic renewal of carriage permits does not violate constitution.

 

Avalon Carriage Service, Inc. v. City of St, Augustine

U.S. court of Appeals (2009)  Automatic renewal of carriage permits does not violate constitution.  ADDED XXXXXX

 

 

Avalon Carriage Service, Inc. v. City of St. Augustine, Florida

 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

236 Fed. Appx. 492, 2007 WL 1575322

March 25, 2009

 

Summary of Opinion

 

Plaintiff,  Avalon, operator of a horse-drawn carriage business, sued the City of St. Augustine, claiming an ordinance allowing automatic renewal of unused hack permits violated the US Constitution.  Avalon alleged that the ordinance unduly burdened interstate commerce, intentionally discriminated against Avalon, and allowed a competitor to ‘hoard” available permits.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City.  The Court of upheld this decision saying that the ordinance neutrally regulated businesses and served a legitimate city interest.   

 

Text of the Opinion

This appeal presents the issue whether a local ordinance that regulates the horse-drawn carriage trade and allows the automatic renewal of unused hack permits violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, or the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. Avalon Carriage Service sued the City of St. Augustine, City Manager William Harriss, City Director of Financial Services Mark Litzinger, Stuart Gamsey, and Gamsey's carriage services and alleged that the ordinances and arbitrary permitting practices of the City unduly burdened interstate commerce, intentionally discriminated against Avalon, and violated state and federal antitrust laws. Avalon complained that the ordinances and practices allowed Gamsey to “hoard” most of the available permits even though he did not use all of those permits. The district court granted partial summary judgment against Avalon on the claims under the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. After a trial on the antitrust claims, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. Avalon then appealed the summary judgment. During the pendency of the appeal, Avalon settled and dismissed its claims against Gamsey and his businesses.

 

We agree with the district court that the claim of Avalon under the Commerce Clause fails. The ordinances evenhandedly regulate in-state and out-of-state businesses and serve a legitimate interest of the City, and Avalon has not identified any arbitrary and capricious permitting rules or practices that unduly burden interstate commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970).

 

We also conclude that the claim of Avalon under the Equal Protection Clause fails. Avalon has failed to establish that the ordinances or permitting practices create an intentional and irrational discriminatory classification. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1201 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000)). That there were limited permits, that Gamsey's permits were renewed in accordance with the ordinances, and that the City refused to revoke and transfer to Avalon what Gamsey legally acquired is not evidence of purposeful discrimination. Even if we were to assume there was discrimination in the decision of the City not to create additional permits, the City had a rational basis for its decision.

 

The summary judgment is AFFIRMED.

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